Supply chain cyberattacks are a significant category of threats affecting digital and cyber-physical systems that depend on a network of third-party providers, manufacturers, and service platforms. In PV environments, where systems rely on inverters, monitoring software, firmware updates, and cloud services from external vendors, these attacks can undermine trust in the entire ecosystem.
These attacks involve inserting malicious code, backdoors, or vulnerabilities into products or services before they reach the end user. Instead of attacking a PV system directly, adversaries compromise a supplier such as a software provider, equipment manufacturer, or service partner and use that trusted relationship to gain access. As a result, operators may unknowingly deploy compromised components within their infrastructure.
Supply chain attacks may target PV systems and solar plants by exploiting firmware updates for inverters, software updates for monitoring platforms, or third-party communication gateways. Once integrated, the malicious component can enable unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or system manipulation. Because these components are trusted, such attacks can remain undetected for long periods.
Join us on Apr. 29 for pv magazine Webinar+ | Decoding the first massive cyberattack on Europe’s solar energy infrastructure – The Poland case and lessons learned
Industry experts will explore real-world cyberattack scenarios, highlight potential vulnerabilities in solar and storage systems, and share practical, actionable strategies to protect your energy assets. Attendees will gain valuable knowledge on how to anticipate, prevent, and respond to cyber threats in the rapidly evolving solar energy sector.
These attacks may also indirectly cause operational and physical risks by altering system behavior, disrupting communication, or introducing hidden backdoors that can be activated later. Inverters, controllers, and SCADA systems may operate under compromised logic, potentially leading to instability, inefficiencies, or safety concerns. Additionally, large-scale deployments of identical components mean a single compromised supplier can impact multiple sites simultaneously.
“Supply chain attacks are especially dangerous because they turn trusted components into attack vectors at scale,” Uri Sadot, Managing Director of SolarDefend and the Chairman of SolarPower Europe's Digitalization workstream, told pv magazine. “They can turn trusted suppliers into Trojan horses inside critical infrastructure.” He added.
Operational modes
Supply chain attacks can occur at different stages of the product or service lifecycle. They may take place during software development, where attackers inject malicious code into applications or updates. Alternatively, they can occur during hardware manufacturing or distribution, where components are tampered with before deployment. In more advanced scenarios, attackers compromise update servers or delivery mechanisms to distribute malicious payloads to many systems at once.
For PV systems, a supply chain attack often begins with targeting a vendor that provides widely used components such as inverter firmware, monitoring platforms, or cloud-based services. Attackers may breach the vendor’s internal systems, modify software updates, or insert hidden
functionality into legitimate products. When operators install updates or deploy new equipment, the malicious code is introduced into the PV environment.
Common techniques in PV environments include trojanized software updates, compromised firmware, and exploitation of trusted remote maintenance tools. In distributed solar fleets, attackers may leverage centralized update mechanisms to affect multiple installations simultaneously, amplifying the impact.
Once the attack is active, operators may not immediately detect any issues, as the compromised components appear legitimate. Over time, signs may include unusual system behavior, unexplained data anomalies, or unauthorized communications with external servers. In many cases, detection occurs only after significant impact or through external disclosure.
Defense
A potential defense against supply chain attacks in PV systems is to implement strict vendor risk management practices, including security assessments and verification of supplier integrity. Operators should ensure that vendors follow secure development practices and provide transparency into their security controls.
Code signing and verification mechanisms are also critical, ensuring that software and firmware updates are authentic and have not been tampered with. Regular integrity checks can help detect unauthorized modifications to system components.
Network segmentation can limit the impact of compromised components by isolating critical systems such as inverters, SCADA platforms, and monitoring tools. This reduces the ability of malicious code to spread across the environment.
Continuous monitoring and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can help identify abnormal behavior originating from trusted components, such as unexpected communications or unusual system activity. However, these tools must be combined with threat intelligence and automated response capabilities to be effective.
Maintaining an inventory of all hardware and software components (asset management) is also essential, enabling operators to quickly identify and respond to vulnerabilities or compromised suppliers.
Overall, supply chain attacks represent a serious risk to PV systems, primarily affecting their integrity, trustworthiness, and operational security. By exploiting trusted vendors and components, these attacks can bypass traditional defenses and impact multiple systems simultaneously.
Although measures such as vendor assessments, code verification, segmentation, monitoring, and asset management can reduce the risk, no single control is sufficient on its own. Systems must be designed with layered security, continuous validation of components, and rapid response strategies.
This approach not only helps detect and contain compromised elements early but also limits the attacker’s ability to scale their impact across interconnected PV systems.
“These attacks don't break in – they come in through the front door. A trusted channel will be used to bring them where they will stay hidden until it's too late ” Sadot stated.
This content is protected by copyright and may not be reused. If you want to cooperate with us and would like to reuse some of our content, please contact: editors@pv-magazine.com.
By submitting this form you agree to pv magazine using your data for the purposes of publishing your comment.
Your personal data will only be disclosed or otherwise transmitted to third parties for the purposes of spam filtering or if this is necessary for technical maintenance of the website. Any other transfer to third parties will not take place unless this is justified on the basis of applicable data protection regulations or if pv magazine is legally obliged to do so.
You may revoke this consent at any time with effect for the future, in which case your personal data will be deleted immediately. Otherwise, your data will be deleted if pv magazine has processed your request or the purpose of data storage is fulfilled.
Further information on data privacy can be found in our Data Protection Policy.